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Abstract— This empirical study assesses the impact of specific 
regulatory policy measures, adopted in the Greek wholesale 
electricity market during the period 2004-2011, on the Day-
Ahead Market Price. We consider an ARMA-GARCH model 
extended to include dummies and other exogenous variables that 
affect market prices, such as RES and Hydro electricity 
production, as well as load volumes and Brent crude oil prices. In 
order to analyse the impact of the regulatory reforms on price 
and volatility dynamics, we include regime dummy variables, 
reflecting the timeline of these reforms. Based on the results, we 
discuss the impact of the examined reforms and their significance.   
Index Terms--Electricity Market, Greek Wholesale Market, 
Regulatory Reform, Day-Ahead Price, GARCH 
I. INTRODUCTION 
uring the last thirty years we have witnessed significant 
efforts towards the deregulation of the electricity sector, 
mainly through the introduction of wholesale electricity 
markets and the unbundling of the traditional vertically 
integrated monopolies. The pioneer in electricity sector reform 
was Chile, commencing its efforts in 1987. Since then, many 
countries all around the world, from New Zealand to US and 
from Argentina to the EU member-states, deregulated their 
markets, following different paths, some proving to be more 
successful than other. 
The differences in the pace and extent of market reforms 
are mainly related to the starting point of each reform and the 
problems associated than with the internal environment of the 
market. This is more evident in Europe, where although a goal 
for a single market has been set since 1996, when Directive 
96/92/EC was adopted, different levels of unbundling and 
introduction of competition have been implemented across the 
member-states. In some cases market reforms are slow 
because of fear for unintended consequences, while in other 
cases the requirement to move away from the status quo and 
the need to take difficult decisions with benefits that will be 
observed only in the long-run seem unappealing to the 
politicians in charge.  
In this context it is crucial to evaluate, in a simple and 
stylized manner, the results of each deregulation process, 
relevant reform steps and policy decisions taken. Although 
this is usually done by examining only the wholesale or retail 
prices, the peculiarities of the electricity markets and the 
complexity of the respective wholesale markets call for a 
multi-dimensional approach, which includes exogenous 
variables affecting price formation. By removing the effect of 
these variables on the wholesale price, one can then better 
assess the impact of each specific policy decision. 
This empirical study assesses the impact of specific 
regulatory policy measures, adopted in the Greek wholesale 
electricity market during the period 2004-2011, on the Day-
Ahead System Market Price (SMP). For this purpose we 
consider an ARMA-GARCH model, extended to include 
seasonal dummies and other exogenous variables that play a 
crucial role in the price formation, such as must-take 
renewable energy sources (RES) production, must-run hydro 
plant production, Brent crude oil prices and load volumes. 
This way we disentangle the SMP from components that 
systematically affect it and proceed to analyze the impact of 
regulatory reforms on price and volatility dynamics by 
including regime dummy variables, which are created based 
on the timeline of these reforms, as presented in Fig.1.  
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This paper contributes to three different strands of literature. 
The first one examines the impact of market reforms on 
electricity prices. In general, empirical research has focused 
on retail prices, through the analysis of cross-country panel 
data [1]-[4], [3] including a detailed survey of the relevant 
literature. On the other hand there is a lack of relevant 
econometric analyses on wholesale prices. The existing 
studies mainly focus on the UK market and especially on the 
question whether the replacement of the UK Pool market 
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mechanism by NETA was beneficial [5]-[7]. By constructing 
a general regression model, the authors find that the drop 
observed in the UK wholesale prices can be explained by the 
changes in market structure [5], the changes in market rules 
[7], or both [6]. The only other study we are aware of is [10], 
assessing the impact of market reforms on the Italian 
electricity spot price. The authors, following a similar 
methodology to the one in this paper, show that changes in the 
electricity industry architecture have affected both the 
wholesale price level and its volatility. 
The second related strand of literature deals with electricity 
price models that include fundamental factors. These factors 
usually concern demand and fuel prices [8]-[12], as well as 
market design changes [13]-[14]. As indicated in [15], models 
with an extensive set of factors have more efficient estimates. 
Finally, the present paper is the second, to our knowledge, 
to study the Greek electricity spot price, following [16], where, 
by applying a variety of econometric models, the authors find 
that the GARCH model has the best estimation and 
forecasting ability. In addition, by splitting the examined 
period into two sub-periods, before and after a specific market 
reform (RAE’s Decision dated 13.01.2006 discussed below), 
and by comparing their estimation outputs for the two periods, 
the authors find that the explanatory power of their model is 
greater in the first period than the second, concluding that the 
regulatory framework change has a significant impact on the 
explanatory and forecasting power of the models.  
In the rest of the paper, Section II describes the Greek 
Wholesale Electricity Market, the various reforms that were 
implemented, and the structure of the market, while Section 
III discusses the data used for this study and their summary 
statistics. Section IV presents the econometric model applied 
and the results of the respective analysis. Based on the results, 
we discuss the impact of the examined market reforms and 
their significance in the concluding Section. 
II. THE GREEK WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKET 
A. Market Reforms – Past and Present  
The liberalization of the Greek Electricity Market began 
with the adoption of Law 2773/1999. Prior to that, it was a 
pure monopolistic market, with PPC, the vertically integrated 
public company, being the single supplier and retailer, as well 
as the sole owner and operator of the grids.  
At the beginning of the market liberalization, base-load 
electricity was mainly produced by lignite plants, with natural 
gas and oil plants acting as mid-merit order units and hydro 
plants acting as peakers. Hydro units were also providing, 
almost exclusively, the ancillary services. On the retail market, 
electricity tariffs were characterized by artificially low prices 
and cross-subsidies between various customer categories. 
The market opening efforts can be divided into three phases: 
(a) 2000 – 2005, (b) 2005 – 2010 and (c) 2010 – present. 
Below we present a synopsis of these reforms, while for more 
details we refer the interested reader to [17]-[20]. 
(a) First Phase. The initial plan was to open the wholesale and 
retail markets simultaneously. A bilateral market was foreseen, 
where the suppliers were required to own generating capacity 
in EU, equivalent to their customers’ consumption. The 
dispatching of the units was performed centrally by the 
Hellenic Transmission System Operator (HTSO) according to 
the economic merit order of the units, based on their short-run 
marginal cost declarations. The new generation units were 
expected to cover their fuel costs from the daily market, while 
their capital cost would be recovered by signing bilateral 
contracts with suppliers or self-supplied customers. The new 
retailers would have access to the same fuel mix as PPC 
through the central dispatch procedure, independently whether 
their units were dispatched or not. Under these arrangements, 
the wholesale market was very closely linked with the retail 
market. In practice though, this was the main weakness of this 
design, as the artificially low retail prices, along with the 
dominant position the incumbent electricity utility (PPC), sole 
owner of lignite and hydro plants, and the fact that the 
independent power producers (IPPs) could only enter the 
market by building “expensive” natural gas plants (compared 
to the cost of lignite and hydro plants), prevented any firm, 
either supplier or retailer, to enter the market, as it was 
impossible for them to recover their costs from the tariffs and 
compete with PPC. 
(b) Second Phase. Substantial amendments aiming at the 
enhancement of market opening and competition in the 
electricity sector were foreseen in Laws 3175/2003 and 
3426/2005. The main restrictions of cost-based dispatch and 
generation capacity ownership for suppliers were dropped and 
a pure mandatory pool model was adopted. The focus this 
time was mainly placed at the wholesale market and the 
attraction of new investments in generation capacity. To this 
end, a capacity obligations mechanism was foreseen, through 
which part of the fixed costs of the electricity generation 
would be recovered. At the same time measures were taken 
for the gradual improvement of the retail market and the 
development of competition, such as the unbundling of PPC 
accounts and the removal of various retail market distortions. 
As the new market model envisaged a series of changes to 
the initial model, a Transitional Period was foreseen, 
originally planned to last 2 years and 3 months, but in practice 
was expanded to 5 years (from October 2005 to September 
2010). During this Transitional Period, a series of market 
reforms foreseen were introduced at five “Reference Days”. 
These reforms gradually transformed the cost-based 
centralized dispatch first to an ex-post (offer-based) 
mandatory pool and subsequently to a centralized mandatory 
day-ahead market with an ex-post imbalance settlement.  
(c) Third Phase. In October 2010 the Transitional Period 
ended and the market moved to the intended market design. In 
brief, the current Greek Electricity Market design consists of 
the following markets/mechanisms: 
1. Day-Ahead Market 
2. Ancillary Services Market 
3. Imbalance Settlement Mechanism 
4. Cost Recovery Mechanism 
5. Capacity Adequacy Mechanism 
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6. Explicit Auctions for Interconnection Capacity 
Rights 
Note that the duration of two mechanisms from the 
Transitional Phase, the Cost Recovery Mechanism and the 
Transitional Capacity Adequacy Mechanism, which greatly 
attributed to the construction of a number of new CCGTs, was 
extended for two more years, as it was decided that the market 
wasn’t mature enough for their removal.  
B. Structure of the Market 
Although until recently the Greek electricity system was 
dominated by lignite units, amounting to almost half of total 
net generation capacity, the significant investments by 
independent power producers (IPPs) in natural gas units and 
renewable energy sources (RES) the last few years evened out 
the generation fuel mix. Table I summarizes the net generation 
capacity data for Greece in the last decade, while more 
detailed information can be found in [20] and [21]. 
 
TABLE I.  INSTALLED CAPACITY IN GREECE 
Plant type 
Net capacity (MW)                               
(at the end of each respective year) 
2011 2007 2004 
Lignite units 4496 4808 4808 
CCGT (n.gas) 3526 1962 1572 
OCGT (n.gas) 487 487 487 
Oil units 698 718 718 
Lake Hydro units 3017 3017 3017 
RES and small 
cogeneration 2141 880 345 
Total 14.365 11.872 10.947 
 
The market was fully dominated by PPC until 2004. As 
RAE didn’t approve new generation licenses for PPC, in order 
to offer the opportunity to new generation companies to enter 
the market, concerns were raised by HTSO on the basis of 
security of supply. Thus, a tender was conducted for the 
provision of ancillary services by new generating units, which 
lead to the entrance of the first IPP (HERON) in 2004 with an 
open cycle natural gas fired 148 MW (OCGT) unit. In the end 
of 2005, right before the launching of the new pool, ENTHES 
– at the time a state controlled company – became the second 
IPP operating a combined cycle natural gas fired 390 MW 
(CCGT) unit.   
During the period 2005 to 2009, PPC owned about 95% of 
the installed capacity of ‘dispatchable’ units (lignite, natural 
gas, oil and large-hydro). Apart from the two IPPs, there was 
also some limited competition from importers, both at the 
wholesale level and at the retail level. The competition at the 
retail level lasted only for about a year (2005), after which the 
increase in fuel prices (combined with the existing low tariffs) 
lead most retailers to withdraw from the market. 
After 2009, the improving market conditions, combined 
with incentives offered to generators through the Transitional 
Capacity Adequacy and Cost Recovery Mechanisms, as well 
as the gradual removal of some retail market distortions, led to 
significant entry of new players. As a result, the wholesale and 
retail market shares of PPC fell from 90% and 100% in 2009 
to approximately 70% and 90% in 2011. 
C. Examined Reforms  
In this paragraph we will highlight a number of dates where 
important market reforms were implemented and briefly 
discuss their content and the effect they were expected to 
have1 on the SMP. The actual effect of the presented reforms 
will be discussed in more detail later on, after the relative 
econometric analysis is performed. A summary of this 
paragraph is presented in Table II. 
As it was mentioned above, during the First Phase of the 
Greek Electricity Market opening the dispatch was performed 
based on the marginal-cost of the units. An indicative ex-post 
price (SMP) was calculated for each hour, equal to the cost of 
the most expensive unit operating unconstrained during the 
respective hour. The combination of the specific market 
structure with the marginal cost based SMP and the low fuel 
cost during that period, lead to relatively stable and low SMPs 
for the largest part of the First Phase. These low SMPs 
weren’t considered to reflect the actual value of the produced 
electricity at each hour, leading to the previously discussed 
market reforms. 
The Second Phase of the market was split into five 
“Reference Days”, with the Fifth Reference Day coinciding 
with the beginning of the Third Phase of the market.  
1st Reference Day (1.10.2005): It marked the beginning of a 
market-based operation of the system. The System Operator 
started dispatching units according to an offer based unit 
commitment. The SMP was calculated the same way as before, 
only this time it was based on offers instead of costs. As a 
price floor, equal to the minimum variable cost of each unit, 
was (and still is) placed to the offers in order to prevent PPC 
from bidding below cost2, equal to the minimum variable cost 
of each unit, in combination with the beginning of commercial 
operation of ENTHES, the SMP was expected to increase. 
2nd Reference Day (1.1.2006) 3 : The only change in the 
market rules was the introduction of the Transitional Capacity 
Adequacy Mechanism, in the form of a capacity payment, 
through which the generation units would be able to recover 
part of their fixed costs. Thus – if the market was more mature 
– one would have expected the prices to drop. 
RAE Decision (13.1.2006): The complaints by market 
participants for the artificially low SMPs due to its calculation 
methodology, along with the practice of the System Operator 
to operate most units at all times for security reasons, even if 
                                                 
1
 As evident from the arguments supporting the relevant decisions and 
RAE’s comments in the Annual Reports to the EC [20]. 
2
 The price floor does not apply to the first 30% of the quantity bid. This 
facilitated the dispatching of units at least at their technical minimum. 
3
 This date is presented only for reasons of completeness, as it is not 
analyzed in our paper due to its small chronological distance with the next 
and more critical reform. 
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TABLE II. EXAMINED MARKET REFORMS 
Variable Date of Reform Reform Expected effect on 
wholesale price  
MR1 01.10.2005     Mandatory pool with ex-post settlement  price increase 
MR2 01.01.2006    Transitional Capacity Adequacy Mechanism none 
MR3 13.01.2006 Changing of SMP calculation methodology price increase 
MR4 01.04.2007 Hourly Bids none (on daily average price) 
MR5 01.05.2008   Cost Recovery Mechanism None 
MR6 01.01.2009    Changing of SMP calculation methodology price decrease 
MR7 30.09.2010   Mandatory day ahead market with Imbalance Settlement price decrease 
MR8 01.09.2011 Natural Gas Consumption Tax price increase 
 
   
that meant having a large number of units operating at their 
technical minimums, led eventually to the change of the 
SMP methodology. The new methodology didn’t consider 
any longer the technical minimum constraints of the units, 
thus it resembled to a pure economic dispatch. Obviously 
this change was expected to significantly increase the 
prices.Code Amendment (1.4.2007): Up to this date the 
offers submitted by the generators were daily. This lead to 
a relatively stable hourly price pattern, as a unit couldn’t 
reflect the daily load pattern on its offers. From 1st of April 
2007 the status of the offers changed from daily to hourly, 
i.e. each generator could submit a different bid for each 
hour of each trading day, bidding higher during peak hours 
and lower during off-peak hours. No overall change on the 
(daily average) SMP was expected. 
3rd Reference Day (1.5.2008): The most important reform 
on the 3rd Reference Day, not foreseen in the original 
transitional plan but added later on, was the establishment 
of the “Cost Recovery Mechanism”, which was considered 
necessary until the Imbalances Settlement Mechanism was 
set (scheduled for the 5th Reference Day). According to this 
mechanism, if the SMP was lower than a unit’s marginal 
cost (plus 5%), the unit would receive the difference as 
compensation. No change on the SMP was expected.  
4th Reference Day (1.1.2009): The main reform, 
originally scheduled for the 3rd Reference Day, but 
postponed because the relevant software was not ready, 
was a change of the ex-post SMP calculation methodology 
according to the unit commitment algorithm that would be 
used on the Third Phase of the market. This algorithm 
considers all technical constraints of the units and the 
reserve requirements of the HTSO and is very similar to 
the one actually used during the dispatch procedure4. The 
inclusion of the technical minimum constraints was 
expected to lead to lower SMPs.    
5th Reference Day (30.9.2010): On the Third Phase of the 
market the mandatory day-ahead market model was 
                                                 
4
 During this phase the market strongly resembled the current (2011) 
market design of SEM in Ireland. 
initiated 5 , co-optimizing energy and ancillary services 
under the aforementioned unit commitment algorithm. The 
clearing of the market was thereon based on the non-priced 
demand declarations submitted by the retailers, instead of 
the HTSO’s forecast used till then. Moreover the 
Imbalance Settlement Mechanism was introduced (no 
separate offers). As the same SMP methodology was 
retained, with the only change being the submission of 
demand declarations (where demand is usually under 
declared), a slight fall to the SMP was expected. 
Ministry of Finance Decision (1.9.2011)6: The Ministry 
of Finance introduced an excise duty on natural gas, 
applied also on the use for electricity production, equal to 
1.50 €/GJ. As the marginal units for the majority of trading 
periods were natural gas fired units, the relevant cost was 
expected to be increase the SMP. 
III. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
A. Data 
We used hourly data on SMP, load, RES production 
(RES) and must-run hydro production (HYDRO), all 
acquired from the Regulator’s database. SMP values are 
denominated in Euros (€) per megawatt hours (MWh), 
whereas the other variables are expressed in megawatts 
(MW) per hour. Additionally, we collected data for the 
Brent crude oil prices (B), denominated in €/bbl, from 
Reuters’ database. As the data for Brent crude oil prices 
were available only for the working days (Monday to 
Friday), we adjusted HTSO’s data in the same way, i.e. by 
excluding weekends7. The sample period covers eight years, 
from January 1st 2004 to November 30th 2011.  
Similar to other studies [22]-[23], we generated a new 
time series by calculating the arithmetic average of the 24 
                                                 
5
 Thus SMP changed from ex-post to ex-ante. 
6
 This reform is included as an example of a reform “outside” the 
specific context of electricity wholesale markets, which may affect them 
though significantly. 
7
 Alternatively we could include a dummy variable for weekends and 
use Brent’s Friday prices for Saturday and Sunday.   
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hourly values for each day and then taking the logarithms 
of the respective values. Furthermore, as the numerical 
values of average daily load are significantly larger than 
the SMP ones, possibly affecting numerically our results, 
we normalized the daily load by dividing all values with 
the maximum load value observed during the sample 
period8. Finally, since Greek wholesale natural gas prices 
are based on a formula linking them to the average prices 
of specific fuel products (Diesel, Heavy Fuel Oil) during 
the previous three months, we calculated the three-month 
moving average of Brent prices (MB) and used this series 
in our analysis, instead.  
B. Summary Statistics 
Table III presents some key descriptive statistics of our 
dataset with 2043 observations for each time series. 
 
TABLE IΙΙ.  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF DATA 
Statistics SMP  Load9 RES Hydro  Brent 
Mean 54.00 6287.84  136.58  443.62 49.87 
Max 117.91 9330.42  686.95  2134.75 130.11 
Min 18.48 3927.08  0.83  28.04 18.97 
Std. dev. 19.16 725.19  101.74  341.38 26.88 
Skew 0.47 0.75  1.32  1.56 1.07 
Kurtosis 2.72 3.91  5.26  5.68 3.57 
J-B test 83.18 260.18  1031.62  1436.56 420.91 
ADF test -3.47* -6.90* -6.67* -6.22* -3.51* 
 Obs 2043 2043 2043 2043 2043 
*indicates statistical significance for Prob< 5% . 
 
By examining Table I, a number of interesting findings 
may be noted. First, consistent with findings from other 
electricity wholesale markets ([12], [15]) we find that none 
of our variables are normally distributed, based on Jarque-
Bera test. All series are slightly right-skewed (except for 
some of the logs) with high excess kurtosis (fat tails). 
Volatility is extremely high, ranging from 11% for the load 
to 90% for the RES production10. The mean SMP is equal 
to 54 €/MWh, presenting a maximum of 117 €/MWh, 
observed on 23.06.2011, as a result of the decreasing hydro 
electricity production, and a minimum 18.48 €/MWh, 
observed on 09.04.2011, when average daily demand 
reached one of its lowest levels at 4.384MWh. Although, 
many studies have found [24]-[25] that electricity prices 
exhibit seasonal behavior during the year, mainly due to 
the seasonal behavior of the load, this feature was not 
observed over the whole sample period.  
                                                 
8
 This is a usual practice, see for example [12] 
9
 The load statistics are presented for the average load values, not the 
normalized ones (ADEM). 
10
 A big part of the observed RES volatility is due to their gradual 
increasing penetration over the examined years. 
Finally, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF-test) in 
all cases rejects the null hypothesis that a unit root exists 
(at the 5% significance level or lower).   
IV. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
A. Model 
As the focus of our investigation is not only the modeling 
of electricity prices and their volatility, but also the 
interpretation of the impact of recent wholesale market 
reforms - as well as other exogenous variables - on them, 
we implement an ARMAX-GARCH model with 
exogenous and binary variables as in [10]. More 
particularly, taking into account the conditions in Greek 
wholesale electricity market , we claim that electricity 
prices can be related to either their own past values 
(ARMA term), as well as to other various exogenous 
factors, such as RES and must-run Hydro  electricity 
production, the three-month moving average Brent prices 
and the normalized demand. Therefore, to accurately 
capture the relationship among prices and other exogenous 
variables, including the binary variables representing the 
Greek electricity reforms, an autoregressive moving 
average model-ARMAX(l,m) written as follows, is used: 
1
( ) ln ( ) ln
n
t t t i tS c e d X k MR u
ι=
Φ ∆ = +Θ Β + + +∑  
 
(1) 2 2
* (0, )t tu e Nσ σ= −  
where l and m are the number of order of autoregressive 
and moving average term, respectively, S is the natural 
logarithm of the spot price level, et are the random 
innovations, Xt is the vector of the exogenous variables in 
logs, ∆ is the back shift operator and MR are binary 
variables that represent market reforms in the Greek 
electricity market. These binary variables take the value of 
0 for the period preceding the market reform, and the value 
of 1 for the successive period.  
Furthermore, taking into account that this model assumes 
homoskedasticity, which in the case of electricity prices 
[24] does not hold, we complement our model with the 
Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Hetorskedastic 
model in order to successfully address the problem of 
heteroskedasticity. In this way, the conditional variance is 
considered time dependent and is represented by a constant 
term, news about volatility from the previous period, 
measured as the lag of the squared residual from the mean 
equation, u2t-i (the ARCH term), last period's forecast 
variance, σ2t-j (the GARCH term), as well as by seasonal 
dummies used in order to capture the day of the week 
effect, by dummies representing market reforms and by the 
set of the exogenous variables, included in the conditional 
mean equation, as follows: 
5
2 2 2
1 1 2 1
q p n
t i t i j t j t i i i
i j i i
a u X D MRσ ω β σ γ δ ε− −
= = = =
= + + + + +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
 
(2)
 
The residuals of the conditional mean equation ut are 
assumed to be white noise N (0,1). Note that in order to 
have a positive definite variance-covariance matrix, the 
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coefficients of ω, α and β must be positive. Moreover, the 
sum of a and b coefficients must be less than one, 
otherwise shocks are persistent and the variance-covariance 
matrix is not stationary.  
The described methodology differs from [5]-[7] and [16] 
in respect of the way the reforms were introduced in the 
model and the exogenous variables included in the analysis. 
B. Empirical Results 
In this section we present the results of the empirical 
estimation of equations (1) and (2). Before interpreting the 
results, we present the identification stage, in which we are 
attempting to obtain the order of ARMA first, through 
Box-Jenkings Model stages, and then the order of GARCH 
and ARCH effects. The Autocorrelation Function 
Coefficients (AFC) and the Partial AFC (PACF) estimates 
of the residual of our model indicate that an autoregressive 
term of order 2, and a moving average term of order 1 
should be used. Further, the AFC and PACF estimation of 
the squared residual of the ARMA specification, suggest 
that a GARCH(1,1) should be chosen. This choice leads to 
elimination of both aurocorrelation and heteroskedasticity 
in our model’s residuals, as evident in the derived values 
for the Ljung-Box statistics. Finally, because the residuals 
are not normally distributed, as the points in the QQ-plots 
do not lie alongside with the straight line11, we used instead 
the t-student distribution12.  
 
TABLE IV.  MEAN AND VARIANCE EQUATION REGRESSION RESULTS 
Mean Equation 
Variable Coef. Std. Error t-Stat. Prob.   
C 3.389 0.373 9.081 0.000 
LOG(HYDRO) 
-0.043 0.006 -6.961 0.000 
LOG(NDEM) 1.296 0.036 35.765 0.000 
LOG(ARES) 
-0.010 0.002 -4.803 0.000 
LOG(MB) 0.309 0.116 2.668 0.008 
MR1 0.184 0.082 2.252 0.024 
MR3 0.286 0.081 3.537 0.000 
MR4 
-0.039 0.044 -0.880 0.379 
MR5 0.134 0.083 1.602 0.109 
MR6 
-0.580 0.036 -15.938 0.000 
MR7 
-0.045 0.063 -0.718 0.473 
MR8 0.244 0.114 2.144 0.032 
AR(1) 1.178 0.044 26.715 0.000 
AR(2) 
-0.201 0.041 -4.843 0.000 
MA(1) 
-0.655 0.034 -19.154 0.000 
R-squared 0.911 
                                                 
11
 The plot was indicating that there are primarily large negative shocks 
that are driving the departure from normality condition. 
12
 Due to space limitations, results of the AFC and PACF, as well as 
QQ-plots are available upon request. 
The regression results are reported in Tables IV and V. 
The goodness of fit is very satisfactory, since most of the 
independent variables are statistically significant, have the 
expected sign and interpret more than 90% of the 
dependent variable variation.  
Equation of Mean 
First of all, in the conditional mean equation, we observe 
that the electricity produced by hydro and RES, has both a 
negative and statistically significant effect on SMP. 
Moreover, this influence is higher for hydro production 
compared to RES production, based on the estimated 
coefficients. A plausible explanation for this is that the 
volumes of electricity produced by hydro are far greater 
than those of RES electricity production, the installed 
capacity of which increased significantly only just in the 
last two years of our sample (see Table I). In addition, 
hydro is used more heavily during peak-hours, contributing 
more to compress peak prices. 
In contrast, the level of demand, as expected, has a 
positive impact on SMP, indicating that a 1% increase of 
the daily demand subject to the maximum record achieved 
over the period analysis, will lead to even higher increase 
of the SMP (1.3%). The three month moving average of 
Brent crude oil prices also has a positive effect on SMP. 
The coefficient of this variable implies that its 1% increase 
is accompanied with a 0.3% increase of SMP. The extent 
of this impact on SMP is rational is reasonable, if we take 
into account that almost 25% of the total electricity 
production is generated by natural gas and oil units.  
Regarding the dummy variables representing the 
examined market reforms, we found that at least four out of 
the seven had a significant impact on the daily SMP, 
consequently also on the market structure. Particularly, the 
1st Reference Day (MR1), as well as RAE’s Decision on 
the 13th of January 2006 (MR3) and the implementation of 
the excise tax (MR8) influenced the SMP positively, based 
on the estimated coefficients. RAE’s decision presents the 
highest impact among them (0.29), followed by the excise 
tax introduction (0.24) and the 1st Reference Day (0.18). 
These coefficients imply a 10 €/MWh SMP increase for the 
first reform and an 8 €/MWh SMP increase for the excise 
tax introduction. 
The accumulated impact of the first two reforms is 
reasonable, based on two facts. Firstly, because the SMP 
during the period preceding of their implementation was 
almost always set by the lignite units (with a marginal cost 
of 25-30€/MWh), while afterwards the lignite units set the 
SMP only during the off-peak hours, with the natural gas 
and oil units setting the SMP for the largest part of the peak 
hours (with a marginal cost of 55-60€/MWh). Secondly, 
the number of hours natural gas and oil units set the SMP is 
roughly 2/3 of total hours 13 . The latter reason also 
                                                 
13
 Therefore, by multiplying the difference in marginal costs with the 
percentage of hours set by natural gas and oil units after the reforms, we 
get (as part of a “back-of-the-envelope calculation”) an effect of 
20€/MWh, similar to our estimations. 
 illustrates why the excise tax introduction on 
units had a slightly lower effect on SMP than expected 
(around 11-15€/MWh). 
However, the most significant impact 
presented by the reforms implemented on the 4th 
Reference Day (MR6). At a first glance this is surprising, 
as the change in the SMP methodology was mainly 
expected to affect the hours when the technical minimum 
constraints are active, that is the off-peak hours. 
examined though in relation with the Cost Recovery 
Mechanism and the price floor constraint (see ft.2)
see that the new algorithm offered strong incentives for a 
specific strategy from the generators: ensure commitment 
of their units by bidding price zero for 30% of their 
capacity, and make extra profits whenever the SMP 
exceeded their costs. Therefore, instead of a slightly milder 
effect compared with the 13.1.2006 reform
declined more significantly, estimated around 13
The above argument is presented in Fig. 2, 
supply curve before the reforms (S.C.1), moved to the left 
after 13.1.2006 (S.C.2), to reflect that the technical 
minimums of the committed units by the HTSO
considered any more. While the curve was expected 
move slightly to the right after the 4th Reference 
(S.C.3), for a quantity equal to the units committed by the 
algorithm (fewer units than HTSO commitment), it moved 
much more due to the unforeseen change in the 
offer strategy change (S.C.4), caused by the Cost Recovery 
Mechanism, practically committing all available thermal 
units and giving a slight higher slope to the supply curve
 
Fig.2. Supply curves during the Second Market Phase
 
With reference to the 5th Reference Day
transition to the Third Phase of the market opening, the 
results show that despite the great debate
participants, raising major concerns regarding 
would have to the wholesale market, and the continuously 
delay of its implementation, the respective reform
                                                 
14
 Because the new algorithm doesn’t commit as many units as HTSO 
actually does during its dispatch process. See also the related discussion in 
Section II subsection C. 
15
 Note also that after the 4th R.D. a number of new generation units 
were commissioned. 
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 (MR6) and the 
 among market 
the effect it 
 had an 
insignificant impact on the market. 
may be also a result of sustaining the
mechanisms (Cost Recovery
Adequacy).  
Finally, the hourly bidding
have any effect on the average SMP, as the producers 
continued to follow the same bidding strategies with the 
preceding period.   
C. Equation of Variance 
Regarding the estimation of the conditional variance 
equation, we observe that the price volatility of the Greek 
wholesale market exhibits a GARCH process, confirming 
the results of the descriptive analysis. The coefficients of 
ω, α and β are statistically significant and positive, which 
indicates that the variance-
definite. In parallel, the sum of
below unity, implying that the variance is stationary, which 
means that a shock does not have a permanent effect on 
variance. This adjustment is estimated to 9 days
Regarding the exogenous variables impact on price 
volatility, we found that although most of them have a 
significant effect on it, the quantified impact is almost 
negligible. As expected, the RES and hydro electricity 
production have a positive impact on price vola
they affect also the level of SMP, whereas the 
the level of demand stabilizes price volatility, 
SMP is set by production units with 
the same lines we showed that the hourly bidding 
procedure increased slightly the volatility of the prices.
TABLE V.  VARIANCE EQUATION 
Variance Equation
Variable Coef. 
C 0.015 
RESID(-1)^2 0.187 
GARCH(-1) 0.710 
LOG(ADEM) -0.002 
LOG(AHYDRO) 0.000 
LOG(ARES) 0.000 
D2 0.005 
D3 -0.005 
D4 -0.001 
D5 -0.001 
MR7 0.000 
R-squared 
 
                                        
16
 The average period of adjustment towards the equilibrium is 
calculated by the following formula: T=ln(0.5)/ln(a+b)
17
 All the other market reforms had no impact 
according their coefficients. These results are not presented here due to 
space limitations. 
7 
On the other hand, this 
 two transitional 
, Transitional Capacity 
 procedure (MR7) did not 
covariance matrix is positive 
 the coefficients α and β is 
16
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Std. Error t-Stat. Prob.   
0.005 2.895 0.004 
0.025 7.369 0.000 
0.030 23.747 0.000 
0.001 -2.967 0.003 
0.000 4.428 0.000 
0.000 1.886 0.059 
0.001 3.802 0.000 
0.001 -4.994 0.000 
0.001 -2.379 0.017 
0.001 -2.286 0.022 
0.000 2.076 0.038 
0.911 
         
 
on the price volatility 
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Finally, we found that price volatility exhibits a seasonal 
behavior during the week, presenting a higher level on 
Tuesday, compared to the mean ω, which represents 
Monday, and then follows a declining trend until Friday. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have addressed the impact of recent 
electricity reforms on the Greek wholesale prices and its 
volatility, a field not adequately explored in the existing 
literature regarding the Greek electricity market. Our 
analysis was based on an ARMA-GARCH approach, 
which proves to accurately represent the volatility of 
electricity prices and also leads to white noise residuals, 
thus enhances the reliability of the tests. 
Our major finding is that although the ultimate goal of 
the implemented market reforms was to enhance the 
competitiveness and effectiveness of the market, some of 
the reforms distorted not only the wholesale market, but 
also the retail market.  
Most importantly we show that the combined 3rd and 4th 
Reference Day reforms influenced negatively the SMP 
more than expected, as a result of the distorted incentives 
given to the market players. This in turn had two effects: 
(a) an increase of the out of the market payments, including 
the RES special levy level, which had to significantly 
increase due to the higher amounts needed to compensate 
RES producers, based on the feed in tariffs, due to the drop 
of the SMP, and (b) on the partial disconnection of the 
SMP values from the fundamental factors governing its 
evolution18.  
Moreover, we conclude that the introduction of excise 
duty natural gas for electricity generation increased 
significantly the SMP, influencing the mix of electricity 
production and inducing a competitive disadvantage to 
natural gas fired generators, as well as decreasing the 
degree of competition among suppliers, as electricity cost 
exceeded in various consumer categories the respective 
regulated retail tariffs.  
The results indicate that important policy decisions 
should be taken under a general framework, always in 
consideration of both past and planned reforms, and be 
supported by an impact assessment accounting for a broad 
array of factors and the expected effects of the reform not 
just to its target, but also to all related aspects. Especially in 
oligopolistic markets, like the electricity market, these 
factors should include the strategic behavior of market 
players. At the same time the policy makers should 
continuously monitor the results of these reforms and be 
prepared to modify or even cancel reforms that may not 
lead to the expected results.  
As a next step, this study can be further extended to 
include the full range of exogenous variables affecting the 
wholesale prices, like hydro reservoir values, 
                                                 
18
 For example the recent increase of the Brent oil prices affected the 
SMP significantly less than before the 4th Reference Day reforms. 
imports/exports, unit availability, as well as variables 
describing the strategic behavior of market participants. 
DISCLAIMER 
The material contained in this paper is for information, 
education, research and academic purposes only. Any 
opinions, proposals and positions expressed in this paper 
are exclusively of the authors and do not necessarily 
represent the views of RAE, partially or unilaterally. 
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